A philosophical history of the idea of the "Democratic Public" in the United States. A provocative Emersonian and Deweyan pragmatic perspective by Garrison, Jim
Garrison, Jim
A philosophical history of the idea of the "Democratic Public" in the United
States. A provocative Emersonian and Deweyan pragmatic perspective
Oelkers, Jürgen [Hrsg.]; Osterwalder, Fritz [Hrsg.]; Rhyn, Heinz [Hrsg.]: Bildung, Öffentlichkeit und
Demokratie. Weinheim u.a. : Beltz 1998, S. 143-164. - (Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, Beiheft; 38)
Empfohlene Zitierung/ Suggested Citation:
Garrison, Jim: A philosophical history of the idea of the "Democratic Public" in the United States. A
provocative Emersonian and Deweyan pragmatic perspective - In: Oelkers, Jürgen [Hrsg.]; Osterwalder,
Fritz [Hrsg.]; Rhyn, Heinz [Hrsg.]: Bildung, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie. Weinheim u.a. : Beltz 1998, S.
143-164. - (Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, Beiheft; 38) - URN: urn:nbn:de:0111-pedocs-94852
in Kooperation mit / in cooperation with:
http://www.juventa.de
Nutzungsbedingungen Terms of use
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und
beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist
ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Die Nutzung stellt keine Übertragung des Eigentumsrechts an diesem
Dokument dar und gilt vorbehaltlich der folgenden Einschränkungen: Auf
sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und
sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen
dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses
Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich
ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to
using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. Use
of this document does not include any transfer of property rights and it is
conditional to the following limitations: All of the copies of this documents must
retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for
public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform,
distribute or otherwise use the document in public.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of
use.
Kontakt / Contact:
peDOCS
Deutsches Institut für Internationale Pädagogische Forschung (DIPF)
Informationszentrum (IZ) Bildung
E-Mail: pedocs@dipf.de
Internet: www.pedocs.de
Zeitschrift für Pädagogik
38. Beiheft
Zeitschrift für Pädagogik
38. Beiheft
Bildung, Öffentlichkeit
und Demokratie
Herausgegeben von
Jürgen Oelkers, Fritz Osterwalder und Heinz Rhyn
Beltz Verlag • Weinheim und Basel
Die in der Zeitschrift veröffentlichten Beiträge sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.
Alle Rechte, insbesondere das der Übersetzung in fremde Sprachen, vorbehalten.
Kein Teil dieser Zeitschrift darf ohne schriftliche Genehmigung des Verlages in irgendeiner
Form - durch Fotokopie, Mikrofilm oder ein anderes Verfahren - reproduziert oder in eine
von Maschinen, insbesondere Datenverarbeitungsanlagen,verwendbare Sprache
übertragen werden. Auch die Rechte der Wiedergabe durch Vortrag, Funk- und
Fernsehsendung, im Magnettonverfahren oder auf ähnlichem Wege bleiben vorbehalten.
Fotokopien für den persönlichen oder sonstigen eigenen Gebrauch dürfen nur von
einzelnen Beiträgen oder Teilen daraus als Einzelkopie hergestellt werden. Jede im Bereich
eines gewerblichen Unternehmens hergestellte oder benützte Kopie dient gewerblichen
Zwecken gem. § 54 (2) UrhG und verpflichtet zur Gebührenzahlung an die VG Wort,
Abteilung Wissenschaft, Goethestr. 49,80336 München, von der die einzelnen
Zahlungsmodalitäten zu erfragen sind.
© 1998 Beltz Verlag ¦ Weinheim und Basel
Herstellung: Klaus Kaltenberg
Satz: Satz- und Reprotechnik GmbH, Hemsbach
Druck: Druckhaus „Thomas MUntzer", Bad Langensalza
Printed in Germany
ISSN 0514-2717
Bestell-Nr. 41139
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Vorwort
Instruction publique, liberal education, Allgemeinbildung
Heinz Rhyn
Die Herausbildung der liberal education in England und Schottland ... 11
Ursula Hofer
„Instruction publique" im französischen Modernisierungsdiskurs
des 18. Jahrhunderts La lecon de Condorcet 29
Jürgen Oelkers
Das Konzept der Bildung in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert 45
Andreas von Prondczynsky
Öffentlichkeit und Bildung in der pädagogischen Historiographie .... 71
Öffentliche Bildung - Wissenschaften und Laizismus
Larry Cuban
The Integration of Sciences into the American Secondary School
Curriculum, 1890s-1990s 89
Fritz Osterwalder
Demokratie und laizistische Schule - die religiöse Grenze der Laizität
Die Konzepte von Demokratie und Schule in der
Dritten Republik Frankreichs 115
Jim Garrison
A Philosophical History of the Idea of the "Democratic Public"
in the United States
A Provocative Emersonian and Deweyan Pragmatic Perspective .... 143
Stefan Hopmann
Der Lehrplan als Standard öffentlicher Bildung 165
Öffentlichkeit und Bildungsinstitutionen
Lucien Criblez
Anforderungen an eine demokratische Bildungsorganisation 191
Margarete Götz
Die öffentliche Ideologie und die Ideologisierung der Grundschule
in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus 209
Toshiko Ito
Die Vervollkommnung der Individualität
Erziehungsideal und Reformabsichten in Japan 225
Öffentliche Bildung und Demokratie
Patricia White
Gratitude, Citizenship, and Education 241
Philipp Gonon
Berufliche Bildung und Gesellschaft in ökonomischer und
pädagogischer Theoriebildung 251
Jim Garrison
A Philosophical History of the Idea of the
"Democratie Public" in the United States:
A Provocative Emersonian and Deweyan Pragmatic Perspective
Abstract
DEWEYan pragmatism offers alternative theories of mind, seif, and society that challenge the cur¬
rency dominant ideology of the democratie public in the Unites States and elsewhere. By tracing
Dewey's thinking to its origin in the essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson we catch a glimpse of what
makes democracy somewhat unique in the U.S., for better and worse. We will also see how Dewey
appropriated and reconstrueted Emerson to develop his own theory of the democratie public.
I will
also examine Dewey's response to the "democratie realists", especially Walier Lippmann, who
were skeptical of Dewey's democratie ideal. This will provide a distant mirror for reflections on our
own era. The paper concludes with some speculations about the future of the democratie public in
the U.S. in the age of multinational cooperate capitalism.
The intellectual history of the idea of "the public" in the West, and especially the
United States, is largely the history of persons signing social contracts. Political
theories of the public usually begin by assuming persons are isolated social, mor¬
al, and psychological beings. The public is usually coneeived as some simple ag-
gregation of atomic individuals into a larger quasi-mechanical system. The Sy¬
stem is supposedly designed to maximize the privaey of social atoms by
protecting them from unwanted control by other atoms or the system itself. The
joys of Romantic modernity are usually confined to the private sphere of passio-
nate imagination. Meanwhile the public sphere consists entirely of Enlighten¬
ment rational planing directed toward securing smooth funetioning of the social
system.
The foregoing assumptions regarding the character of the public are en-
sconced in what I call Western Folk Psychology (WFP), Western Folk Morality
(WFM), and Western Democratie Liberalism (WDL). Together they constitute
the dominant ideology of Western social, political, and economic thought. This
ideology provided the seeds from whence the modern idea of a democratie
public sprang. Today, though, it is time to sow new seeds if democracy is to flour-
ish throughout the world. Deweyan pragmatism attempts to provide alternative
theories of mind, seif, and society that challenge the entrenched democratie
ideology of the public (and the private) while disclosing new possibilities for
exploration.
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Western Folk Psychology, Morality, and Democratie Liberalism
The foUowing list of enabling beliefs and values constituting WFP will look very
familiär: (1) There exists a mental realm apart from the social and physical. This
realm has at least four members called the faculties: Perception, passion, will,
and reason. (2) Perception receives sense impressions from the body and re-
routes them to reason and/or passion. (3) Passions arise through bodily experi¬
ence. (4) The will is capable of making free decisions to act uncoerced by
physical forces. This freedom is the prime mover of unique and autonomous
personality. (5) Reason calculates, passes judgment, and formulates theoretical
or practical principles of thought and action. The will then receives the results of
rational machination. (6) Passion and reason both exert, often opposite, force on
the will. (7) Will exerts force on the body causing it to act. Will may resist either
reason or passion. The stronger the will the better it resists the force of passion.
Most Western psychological theories are but some permutation of these princi¬
ples. Moreover, most Western social, political, and economic theory assumes
such a psychology. Western Folk Psychology is part of the dominate discourse of
Western modernity. John Dewey rejeeted WFP entirely, and his thought has
been marginalized as a result. For Dewey, freedom and rationality are not indi¬
vidual, innate endowments; instead, they represent shared social achievements.
Western Folk Morality also looks very familiär: (1) It assumes WFP. Bodily
passions pursue pleasure and avoid pain and härm. Passions are not intrinsically
rational. (2) The problem of morality arises because people can help or härm
other people. Possessing free-will, human beings can exercise reason to formu-
late rules, principles, and laws regarding how they ought to act. They alone de-
eide whether to obey these laws. (3) General moral laws are disclosed by univer¬
sal, necessary, and a priori reason that determines what we must do (prescrip-
tions) and what we must not do (prohibitions). (4) Morality consists in obeying
reason while immorality consists in deviating from reason.1 Morality is a power
struggle in the economy of forces described by perception, passion, will, and
reason. We struggle to preserve the purity of reason and the resolve of the will
against the constant temptations of passionate embodiment. Western legisla-
tures and courts of law assume all of this without question.
The enabling beliefs and values of Western Democratie Liberalism look like
this: (1) It assumes WFP and WFM. (2) It assumes the essential autonomy of
individual will and personality. (3) It places an absolute value on individual (so¬
cial, political, economic, intellectual, and religious) freedom and equality. (4) It
believes individuals are born with inalienable natural rights in virtue of their
humanity. (5) It assumes rationality is the essence of individual human beings
and that they are essentially good. (6) It asserts the State and all public institu¬
tions arise because of a social contract drawn between innately free, autono¬
mous, rational individuals and the State solely for the rational purpose of pre-
serving and protecting individual natural rights. Further, if unalienable rights are
violated by the State, the contract is broken. (7) A belief that social control is best
secured by rule of law. (8) The existence of a transcendental order of truth acces-
1 The descriptions of WFP and WFM are adapted from Johnson (1993, pp. 15-17).
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sible to humankind's natural reason and capable of evolving a moral response.
This order is the source of abstract, formal natural laws of physical and human
nature.
The public on such an account is assumed to emerge historically because of
tacit or explicit social contracts between psychological and moral atoms electing
to participate in a democratie social solar system that places a premier or Presi¬
dent at the center. I want to challenge these dogmas using the resources of Dew-
eyan pragmatism with special emphases on pragmatic social construetivism.
Cross Pollinating the Seeds ofthe Democratie Public:
Liberalism in the New World
The American revolution sowed the seeds of Western democratie liberalism into
the soil of a new world. These have evolved many mutations, although only prag¬
matism flourished. Emerson is probably the first identifiable instance of this still
evolving strain. The old world seed stock, however, remains supreme even in
the
new world. My pragmatic democratie faith is that someday, somewhere, pragma¬
tism will prevail.
Ralph Waldo Emerson is less than a great poet, prophet, or philosopher. He
is more than a fine essayist. Cornell West (1989) argues that somehow America
evaded "epistemology centered philosophy" evolving instead "a conception of
philosophy as a form of cultural criticism" (p. 5). Perhaps it is best to read Emer¬
son as America's first great cultural critic and the one who pointed the way to
pragmatism. In evading epistemology, Emerson overthrows many of the epis-
temologically centered elements of traditional democratie ideology.
Emerson developed a discourse that allowed a former Colony to begin think¬
ing for itself. Most interpret him as fleeing history and refusing all authority.
Emerson calls for a new kind of "man" fit to oecupy a new world. Emerson
looked upon America as almost a new Eden
where a new Adam could roam as
he did before the fall. It is impossible to escape history and extremely difficult to
overcome the authoritarian prejudices of one's culture. Emerson himself was
sexist and racist, although less strident than most in his day. Nonetheless, West is
right to say Emerson sueeeeded in developing patterns of distinctly American
thought that also relate to "the European explosions (both intellectual and so¬
cial) that produced Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Carlyle, and
Friedrich Nietzsche" (p. 11).
Emerson preached a doctrine of perpetual revelation expressing what West
calls "Emerson's theodicy" (p. 17). Emerson's response to the problem of evil is
the foUowing trinity: (1) Existence is "congenial to and supportive of the moral
aims and progress of the chosen or exceptional people," (2) "the basic nature
of
things, the fundamental way the world is, is itself incomplete and in flux" and (3)
"the experimental makings, workings, and doings of human beings have been
neither adequately understood nor fully unleashed on the modern world" (pp.
15-16). This trinity establishes America's secular religion.
The first doctrine of Emerson's trinity is a Statement of what some call "Amer¬
ican exceptionalism". For some reason those that fled the old world thought that
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they became new "men" amid the vast regions of unsullied land they settled.
Immigration somehow freed them of the corruption of the old world. Slavery,
the genocide of native Americans, and the continued oppression of women were
conveniently ignored.
It cannot be denied, though, that through four centuries millions born into
Europe's underclass found wealth and social Status within their lifetime upon
immigrating. In a very real sense these people often lived exceptional lives.
There was authentic cause for optimism, a sense of newness, and novel creation.
It was possible to imagine oneself at a new beginning of history.
In the opening paragraph of his essay "Nature" Emerson boldly writes:
The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should
not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and
philosophy of insight and not tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of
theirs?
Well, why not? Everyone born into the world is as unique and one time only an
event in the universe as their fingerprints. We are alive, and it will not always be
so. No one ever has and ever will look upon the world exactly as we are looking
now. Every child born into the world is an original beginning, a new Start, and a
break from tradition. Emerson issues a provocation to creative action, to exer-
cise our powers in a world that at worst does not care, so makes no special Pro¬
vision against us. The creation is sufficiently congenial to support meaningful
moral action, that is enough.
The second member of Emerson's trinity alleges that we live in a world of flux
and creative possibility. Ours is a forever contingent, uncertain, and evolving
universe, but it is a provocation to action and a price any creator is willing to pay.
In the essay "Circles" Emerson observes, "There are no fixtures in nature. The
universe is fluid and volatile". And in "The Poet" Emerson writes, "For all Sym¬
bols are fluxional; all language is vehicular and transitive, and is good, as ferries
and horses are, for conveyance, not as farms and houses are, for homestead". For
Emerson, humankind is a participant in, and not a spectator of, an unfinished
and unfinishable universe.
The final figure of Emerson's trinity is the release of intelligent experimental
inquiry in the hands of free individuals bent on deliberately using the results to
create a better world. Emerson abandons the quest for epistemological certainty
and ultimate foundations for knowledge. His concern is with creative transfor-
mation and, therefore, with what ought to be today rather than with what is,
supposedly, for eternity. Knowledge is purely instrumental for Emerson; it is not
a matter of privileged representation or correspondence to reality. Like lan¬
guage, it is a vehicle. Language, knowledge, and essences are all but means crea-
ted to help us achieve the aims we desire. They are instruments; tools of creative
action.
Emerson issues a provocation to heroic action in an ever changing
world where creation, including self-creation, is forever necessary. In "Circles"
he asserts:
Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth that around every circle another can be drawn; that there
is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning ... This fact ... symbolizes the moral fact of the
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Unattainable ... at once the inspirer and the condemner of every success, may conveniently serve
us to connect many illustrations of human power.
A world without end or beginning, a world without fixed center or circum-
ference, a world forever in flux, is a world that provokes the trial of our experi¬
mental creations, exertions, and practices. Later in "Circles" Emerson proclaims,
"I am only an experimenter ... I unsettle all things." Emerson's essays are true
to the definition of the word "essay;" they are a trial, an experiment, an assay of
meaning and value.
Emerson thought diseiplined intelligence could create cosmos out of chaos. In
the essay "Nature", Emerson insisted with two fisted confidence that "the world
exists for you ... Build, therefore, your own world". Emerson struggles to over-
come the constraints of history even to the point of moral transgression. If self-
reliance and moral consciousness require it, then an authentic agent must trans-
gress custom, law, and tradition. In an unfinished and unfinishable
universe the
ultimate meaning of any action remains eternally unknown. All we may do is
perform new experiments, devise new plans of action, and otherwise seek means
to mortal ends. Because action needs to be intelligent as well as creative, it is
wise to experiment upon the values one envisions as ends by examining their
consequences.2
Emerson heid an ideal of a nonhierarchical, egalitarian, and democratie soci¬
ety, but only for those special people provoked to action, power, and self-crea-
tion. Having set tradition aside, Emerson embraces the public marketplace.
There he finds flux, risk, and the need for continuous action as well as transac-
tion and reeiprocal provocation. His praise of the marketplace is, however, am¬
bivalent. He feels market forces undermine authority, overthrow tradition, and
place the bürden of life upon isolated individuals where it belongs. Emerson,
nonetheless, decries the crass materialism of the marketplace and the loss of
self-reliance in the possession of property. Markets have replaced history for
many in the modern world. Emerson retains a deep commitment to the essen-
tial autonomy of the individual will and personality. Because Dewey is a social
construetivist who believes minds and selves are social funetions, he celebrates
democratie Community more than democratie individuals. That does not mean
Dewey abandons self-creation; the difference is that for him, self-creation is a
social-historical achievement of concrete communities.
Dewey's Self-Creating Appropriation ofEmerson
West (1989) boldly declares:
Dewey is the greatest of the American pragmatists because he infuses an inherited EMERSONian
preoecupation with power, provocation, and personality
- permeated by voluntaristic.amelioristic,
and activistic themes - with the great discovery ... of historical consciousness that highlights the
conditional and circumstantial character of human existence in terms of changing societies,cultures,
and communities (pp. 69-70).
It is no surprise that the first edition of Nietzsche's; The Gay Science carries an epigraph from
Emerson's essay "History".
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Dewey appropriates those aspects of Emerson he approves and either ignores
or reconstructs those he rejects. Dewey re-creates his cultural tradition by re-
creating the historical meaning of its undeniable influences. Dewey's is a very
creative, very EMERSONian, reading of Emerson. Dewey calls this kind of reading
"reconstruction". While we cannot escape history we can always reconstruct en-
trenched cultural meanings in the present thereby redirecting what the past
means for the future. That is the goal of my paper.
Dewey (1903/1976) regards those who think Emerson clever though confused
display their own "incapacity to follow a logic that is finely wrought" (p. 184).
Emerson's ideas are not framed in the logic of formal hypothetical reasoning.
He believes Emerson's work "a hymn to intelligence, a paean to the all-creating,
all-disturbing power of thought" (p. 187). Dewey rejects the Separation of creat¬
ive from rational thought (see Garrison, 1997). Dewey (1903/1976) proclaims it
is "no more possible to eliminate love and generation from the definition of the
thinker than it is thought and limits from the conception of the artist. It is inter¬
est, concern, caring, which makes the one as it makes the other" (p. 186). Emo¬
tion and imagination are an intrinsic and necessary part of deliberation. Emer¬
son and Dewey draw no ultimate dualism between poet and philosopher.
Eventually, Dewey comes to prefer the word "intelligence" to "reason" because
the history of the latter term has become so entangled with anti-empirical, tran-
scendental, and supernatural doctrines Dewey's naturalism denounces.
Dewey feels that for Emerson "reference to the immediate life is the text by
which he tries every philosopher" (p. 188). If the contingencies and risks of life
provoke us to exercise our powers of action, the response must be both intel¬
ligent and creative, otherwise it will be insufficient to life. So where does one find
truth in a contingent and risky world? Dewey thinks Emerson "finds truth in the
highway" (p. 189). In many ways it is the adventure not the destination that
matters most for Dewey and Emerson. What Dewey says of Emerson we could
say of Dewey:
His ideas are not fixed upon any Reality that is beyond or behind or in any way apart ... They are
versions of the Here and the Now, and flow freely. The reputed transcendental worth of an over-
weening Beyond and Away, Emerson, jealous for spiritual democracy, finds to be the possession of
the unquestionable Present (pp. 190-191).
Dewey realizes many philosophers worship Reason as an abstract noun much as
others worship the abstract noun God. His theodicy, like Emerson's, finds God
in the highway of life. Dewey (1934a/1986) asserts that it is the "active relation
between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 'God'" (p. 34). This
active relation is a living relation that strives in the present to transform the way
the world is into the way the world morally ought to be. The logic of such a
relation is practical means-ends reasoning. Dewey does not fix his ideas of God
or Reason on any Reality beyond, behind, or apart. Life upon the highway re-
quires applying yesterday's lessons to today's tasks of creating a better tomor-
row. This sentiment expresses Dewey's natural piety before the miracle of life
and wonder of existence. Dewey thought democracy one important way that
people work together to build a better future.
Dewey (1903/1976) concludes:
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Emerson Stands for restoring to the common man that which in the name of religion, of philosophy,
of art and of morality has been embezzled from the common störe and appropriated to seetarian
and class use ... He is the Philosopher of Democracy (p. 190).
In this passage Dewey mistakenly attributes to Emerson a virtue he did not
entirely possess. Emerson was a democratie elitist; Dewey a philosopher of pop¬
ulär democracy. Dewey departs dramatically from Emerson in other ways.
First, Dewey was a naturalized Hegelian for whom not only rationality, but all
meanings are historically constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed in the
social practices of culture. Unlike G. W. F. Hegel (or Marx), though, there is no
end of history for Dewey any more than there is for Emerson. For them, mea¬
nings are on the highway; there is no final destination. The meaning of life for
them is to make more meaning, what Dewey simply calls "growth". Second,
Dewey has a social theory of the mind and the seif. For these reasons, Dewey
emphasizes Community and communication in ways Emerson ignores. Indeed,
he develops a communicative ideal of democracy. Finally, Dewey does not share
Emerson's naive optimism. Dewey is a meliorist, not an Optimist. He has been
wildly misunderstood on this last point.
Dewey (1922/1983) reflects: "There is something pitifully juvenile in the idea
that 'evolution', progress, means a definite sum of aecomplishment which will
forever stay done ... and advancing us just so far on our road to a final stable and
unperplexed goal" (p. 197). One does not need to think things are getting better
to do her best, or that there is some cosmic backup story guaranteeing success.
Dewey's attitude is that.of the meliorist in contrast to the Optimist. Dewey
(1920/1982) depicts meliorism thus:
Meliorism is the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one moment, be they compara-
tively bad or comparatively good, in any event may be bettered. It encourages intelligence to study
the positive means of good ... and to put forth endeavor for improvement of conditions (pp.
181-182).
One may choose to stop and ameliorate even hopeless situations on the road of
life. In spite of his criticisms, Dewey affirms Emerson's trinity, although he
would never have called it that. Dewey rejeeted the notion of American excep-
tionalism as well as the inevitability of progress. He did think existence congeni-
al to and supportive of our moral aims and of meliorism. According to Dewey
(1929/1984), "Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for secu-
rity" (p. 3). Dewey contrasts two ways human beings have sought security. The
first involves "an attempt to propitiate the power which environ him and deter-
mine his destiny. It expressed itself in supplication, sacrifice, ceremonial rite and
magical eult" (p. 3). This is the way chosen by those that do not believe existence
congenial to human purposes. The second way "is to invent arts and by their
means turn the powers of nature to account; man construets a fortress out
of the
very conditions and forces which threaten him ... This is the method of changing
the world through action" (p. 3). Even when humankind has turned to practical
arts to better its lot, humanity has still assumed there is a realm apart from art
and everyday existence that is the exclusive province of theory.
Dewey (1925/1981) explicitly rejeeted the theory versus practice distinetion:
"Science is an art... art is practice, and ... the only distinetion worth drawing is
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not between practice and theory, but between those modes of practice that are
not intelligent... and those which are" (pp. 268-269). Critical and creative intel¬
ligence is what releases the experimental makings, workings, and doings of hu¬
man beings within a world congenial to our moral aims. According to Dewey
(1934b/1987), "Science itself is but a central art auxiliary to the generation and
utilization of other arts" (p. 33). He understood science as merely refined, prac¬
tical, means-ends, reasoning; it is a way of creating what morally ought to exist. A
tool for intelligently turning nature in such a way as to secure our moral aims
and desires.
Dewey rejeeted those forms of metaphysics that assert that the truly real is
eternal, immutable, necessary and to be known with theoretical certainty. Dewey
(1938/1986) affirmed the ephemeral, mutable, and contingent that could,
through inquiry, provide practical "warranted assertibility" but never absolute
certainty (p. 15). He (1925/1981) insisted on "the ineradicable union in nature of
the relatively stable and the relatively contingent" (p. 56). In such a world, "The
striving to make stability of meaning prevail over the instability of events is the
main task of intelligent human effort" (p. 49). Nonetheless, the flux of existence
is fully affirmed.
Dewey embraces Emerson's second doctrine that the basic nature of things is
incomplete and in flux. Charles Darwin proposed a scientific theory of what
Emerson intuited. Dewey (1920/1982) learned this provocative lesson well:
"change rather than fixity is now a measure of 'reality'... change is omni-pres-
ent," he writes, "natural science is forced by its own development to abandon
the assumption of fixity and to recognize that what for it is actually 'universal' is
process" (pp. 114,260). Estimations are that 99% of all species that have ever
lived are now extinet. In such a world breaks from tradition oeeur every time a
species vanishes. A species is an essence, an eidos. Dewey's neo-Darwinian real-
ization is that what holds for biological forms or essences also holds for logical
and ontological forms as well. The essences of things, including the objects postu-
lated by theories and methods of science, are relatively stable, yet their existence
is precarious. Dewey (1925/1981) declared, "A thing may endure...and yet not
be everlasting; it will crumble before the gnawing tooth of time, as it exceeds a
certain measure" (p. 63). Nature, including human nature, is always in flux. De¬
wey's psychology extends these insights regarding the contingency of existence
into the study of human nature. The implications for his concept of individuality
and the public will become clear later.
We have already seen the experimental aspects of the third part of Emerson's
trinity are present in Dewey as well. Dewey (1929/1984) rejeeted "the old spec-
tator theory of knowledge" in favor of a "partieipant" view wherein "knowing is
one kind of interaction which goes on within the world" (p. 163). For Dewey,
human nature is a part of nature, therefore working within nature we may artis-
tically trans-form it so as to secure the ends, values, and goods we seek.
Reasoning, for Dewey, is always practical reasoning carried out to secure the
values we desire. This is not mere practicalism; Dewey thought it very important
to distinguish between objects of immediate desire and those that recommend
themselves upon philosophical reflection.
"Philosophy", for Dewey (1925/1981), "is inherently criticism" (p. 298).
Educational philosophy is inherently criticism as well. Criticism of what? Dewey
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responds that "the most far-reaching question of all criticism [is]... the relation-
ship between existence and value, or as the problem is often put, between the
real and ideal" (p. 310). The philosopher of education must ask: What knowledge
is of most value? What is the end of education? By philosopher here I do not
mean professional academic philosophy. Dewey (1917/1980) spoke of "The
Need For a Recovery Of Philosophy". For him, "Philosophy recovers itself when
it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and be-
comes a method cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of
men" (p. 46). Dewey championed the ideal of the peripatetic philosopher
reflecting upon the issues she encounters on the road of life. The problems of
education are equally the possession of historian, sociologist, teacher, and above
all, Citizen. All may engage in philosophical reflection as Dewey understands it,
and their results should enter into the larger public debate. Dewey championed
the ideal of the uncloistered public intellectual.
Philosophy and Democracy
In "Philosophy And Democracy", Dewey (1919/1982) explicitly affirms the first
and third members of Emerson's trinity, and implicitly affirms the second:
All deliberate action is in a way an experiment with the world to see what it will stand for, what it
will promote and what frustrate. The world is tolerant and fairly hospitable. It permits and even
encourages all sorts of experiments ... Democracy is a form of desire and endeavor which reaches
further and condenses into itself more issues (p. 49).
The world is congenial and supportive of humankind's moral aims, and it will
respond to the experimental makings, workings, and doings of human beings.
Because the world is contingent and in flux, experimentation and inquiry are
both necessary and possible. The last sentence of this passage describes de¬
mocracy as a form of desire and deliberate endeavor condensing into itself many
philosophical issues. Democracy is a social experiment, a tool we are testing to
see if it works and will help us make a better world.
Dewey distinguishes between two philosophies. The first seeks to become a
super science, so it wants to determine a body of fixed and final facts, laws, and
principles. This philosophy imagines it "somehow knows reality", as Dewey puts
it, "more ultimately than do the other sciences" (p. 42). The second sense, the one
he advocates, is true to the etymology of the word "philosophy". It is a form of
desire and Dewey thinks democracy its finest form.
The word "philosophy" derives from the ancient Greek philein (to love) and
sophia (wisdom). Philosophers are lovers of wisdom, that is what they most pas-
sionately desire. Here is how Dewey (1919,1982) understood wisdom:
By wisdom we mean not systematic and proved knowledge of fact and truth, but a conviction about
moral values, a sense for the better kind of life to be led. Wisdom is a moral term, and like every
moral term refers not to the Constitution of things already in existence, not even if that Constitution
be magnified into eternity and absoluteness. As a moral term it refers to a choice about something
to be done ... It refers not to aecomplished reality but to a desired future which our desires, when
translated into articulate conviction, may help bring into existence (p. 44).
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Wisdom concerns itself with the possible beyond the actual that morally ought
to exist. Cognitive rationality alone remains captured by what is, the actual. One
cannot derive an ought from an is, so cognitive rationality alone is not enough
for our active desire to secure the good. The way the world is constitutes but a
provocation to passionately pursue what ought to exist. What ought to exist,
though, is often the possible beyond the actual, something only grasped by the
wise exercise of imagination. Dewey (1934b/1987) concludes: "'Reason' at its
height cannot attain complete grasp and a self-contained assurance. It must fall
back upon imagination - upon the embodiment of ideas in emotionally charged
sense" (p. 40). Rationality, for Dewey, is a matter of imagination, embodiment,
and emotion. It is wrong to read him as devoted to scientific technique. For him,
philosophy and poetry intertwine; it is a mistake to read Dewey as devoted to
scientific technique.
Dewey (1919/1982) investigates "the historic formula of the greatest liberal
movement of history - the formula of liberty, equality and fraternity" (p. 49). He
provides a pragmatic reformulation. Dewey distinguishes two formulas for free¬
dom. The first we have already discussed. It says "men are free when they are
rational, and they are rational when they recognize and consciously conform to
the necessities which the universe exemplified" (p. 49). Democratie Western
Liberalism understands social reality as existing under eternally fixed forms that
may be known indubitably. Dewey concludes that this form of freedom "is not
one which is spontaneously congenial to the idea of liberty in a society which has
set its heart on democracy" (p. 50). Genuine freedom requires the second mem-
ber of Emerson's trinity, a universe of flux and contingency. Dewey avers:
Men to achieve democracy will construe liberty as meaning a universe in which there is real uncer-
tainty and contingency, a world which is not all in, and never will be, a world which in some respect
is incomplete and in the making, and which in these respects may be made this way or that accord¬
ing as men judge, prize, love and labor (p. 50).
Humanity partieipates in an infinitely pluralistic and semantically inexhaustible
universe. Dewey is a transactional realist for whom existence is a plenitude of
historical events. Each event is a mixture of actual and potential. The actual
requires us to acknowledge that "there is in things a grain against which we
cannot successfully go" (p. 50). Knowing the grain of events is important because
freedom involves constraint as well as release. The actual in any historical event
serves to actualize the potential in other events, and conversely. Human beings
are events. We are born, develop, become educated, contribute to our culture,
and die. Human intercourse is likewise transactional. Dewey's partieipatory and
infinitely pluralistic metaphysic influences his preference for partieipatory and
pluralistic democracy.
Dewey analyzed equality in terms of inequality. Inequality requires hierarchy;
the results of which he calls the "metaphysics of feudalism" (p. 51). Dewey
thinks Medieval philosophy was "an attempt to reconcile authority with reason"
and an apologetic for the existing social order devoted to the quest for certainty
and authoritative foundations in the Kingdom of God (p. 52). Dewey believes
Western Democratie Liberalism remains disabled by an almost feudalistic philo¬
sophy that allows society to treat individuals in a hierarchical, quasi-feudalistic,
way. Dewey concludes that "whatever equality means for democracy ... the
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world is not to be construed as a fixed order of species, grades or degrees" (p. 52).
Instead, Dewey avers:
Every existence ... has something unique and irreplaceable about it, that it does not exist to illus-
trate a principle,... or to embody a kind or class. As philosophy it denies the basic principle of
atomistic individualism as truly as that of rigid feudalism. For the individualism [WFP and WFM]
traditionally associated with democracy makes equality quantitative, and hence individuality some¬
thing external and mechanical rather than qualitative and unique (pp. 52-53).
Educational reform in the United States today treats children as ciphers not
selves. Educational reform revolves almost entirely around test scores while is¬
sues of diversity are shunted aside. Human beings are coneeived as human capi¬
tal for the economic produetion funetion.3 Virtually all public educational dis-
course in the United States relies on the quantitative language of calculative
rationality and business. Development of one's unique individual abilities, or
even preparation for democratie citizenship, is rarely mentioned. It assumes
having more means being more.
Dewey redefines equality in terms of qualitative uniqueness instead of quan¬
titative quasi-mathematical equivalence:
In social and moral matters, equality does not mean mathematical equivalence. It means rather the
inapplicability of considerations of greater and less, superior and inferior. It means ... the fact of
individuality, the manifestation of something irreplaceable ... It implies ... a metaphysical mathe¬
matics of incommensurable in which each speaks for itself and demands consideration on its own
behalf (p. 53).
A great deal of academic discussion in the U. S. today deals with issues involving
dialogue across differences and the importance of including perspectives differ¬
ent from the supposed norm. The public discussion in educational reform is
about norm referenced tests and mythical back to basics curriculum that does
little more than restore the Privileges of the social classes with sufficient power
to define what "the basics" or "the normal" are. Dewey's vision of democracy
protects us from the dietatorship and dogma of those elites having the power to
impose their ideas upon the body politic. For Dewey, eultivating differences and
including others different from the norm is an important funetion of democracy
because we live in a pluralistic universe.
Dewey believes a proper understanding of democracy is partieipatory and
communicative; therefore, fraternity is not a quasi-mechanical system for lawful-
ly conjoining social atoms. He concludes:
If democratie equality may be construed as individuality, there is nothing forced in understanding
fraternity as continuity, that is to say, as association and interaction without limit. Equality, indivi¬
duality, tends to isolation and independence. It is centrifugal.To say that what is specific and unique
can be exhibited and become forceful or actual only in relationship with other like beings is merely
... to give a metaphysical Version to the fact that democracy is concerned not with freaks or geni-
uses or heroes or divine leaders but with associated individuals in which each by intercourse with
others somehow makes the life of each more distinetive (p. 53).
The metaphysics at work here is transactional realism. Viewing human beings as
historical events, it completely rejects WFP and WFM. The meaning of the mind
3 For instance, I hold my appointment in "The College of Human Resources and Education".
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and the seif, instead, emerges historically in human intercourse. What is actual in
one person actualizes the potential in another, and conversely. Just think of your
love life and all it means. Dewey (1925/1981) declares, "Of all affairs, communi-
cation is the most wonderful... sharing is a wonder by the side of which transub-
stantiation pales. When communication occurs, all natural events are subject to
reconsideration and revision ... Events turn into objects,things with a meaning"
(p. 132). Meanings, including the meaning of mind, seif, and society, emerge
slowly in time through discourse and other forms of social transaction. Society is
a historically evolving event that we may not entirely objectify. Dewey under-
stood democracy as part of the continuing conversation of humankind.
Dewey conceived democracy as moral, economic, and educational, not just
political. Dewey's (1916/1980) pluralistic conception of democracy led him to
the foUowing communicative definition of democracy:
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of
conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who par¬
ticipate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the
action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to breaking down barriers of
class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the füll import of their activity
(p. 93).
The public, governmental structure assumed by a democracy is of secondary
concern. Government does not matter as long as it promotes communication.
Conversation for Dewey was about creating and sharing meaning; it was about
growth. We may secure and continue the conversation in many diverse ways and
diversity is the key to creative conversation. Versions of elitist democracy resem-
bling Emerson's reappeared in the 1920's to challenge Dewey's transactional,
communicative, and creative vision.
Democratie "Realism": Government For the People*
The so-called "democratie realists" of the 1920's began to erode two fundamen¬
tal pillars of liberal democracy. First, the "discovery" of the irrational subcon-
scious undermined Modern Democratie Liberalism's belief in the capacity of
everyone to engage in rational political action. FREUDian psychology is the best
known instance. Second, arguments arose alleging that few people are sufficient-
ly rational to participate in democratie politics. The idea began to circulate that
democracy is the EMERSONian prerogative of privileged experts. America started
becoming a planned rather than planning society. The result is today we have
government for the people rather than by the people.
The first world war, the supposed war to end all wars, left the nation in a bitter
and cynical mood. It was also the era in which psychology and the social sciences
came into their own. At the same time, the American academy was thoroughly
professionalized. Professionalism meant embracing the highly successful
techniques of the physical sciences. During this period logical positivism
4 I have found Robert B. Westbrook (1991) valuable in developing this section and the next.
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emerged as the dominant intellectual force in the English speaking world. The
historical movements that pushed Dewey's philosophy to the margins of 20th
Century thought were under way. Democracy has yet to recover from these
events.
The use of Propaganda in the first world war to whip the populace to hysteri-
cal nationalism suggested that the public is docile and easily manipulated. These
techniques have become refined into today's fifteen second rhetorical "sound
bites". The results of intelligence tests administered to 1,700,000 military person-
nel putatively proved over half of those tested were mentally deficient. Such
prominent psychologist as Lewis M.Termin and William S.McDougall argued
for the veracity of such tests that also "proved" the superior intelligence of An-
glo-Saxon racial stock. Today in the United States those who still adhere to such
racist nonsense find support in the "science" of intelligence testing. Intelligence
testing still assumes the validity of WFP.
The social sciences claimed to provide "value-free" knowledge. For example,
in his 1929 presidential address to the American Sociological Society, William F.
Ogburn asserted a stance that still holds for almost all departments of American
higher education:
Sociology as a science is not interested in making the world a better place in which to live, in
encouraging beliefs, in spreading Information, in dispensing news, in setting forth impressions of
life, in leading the multitudes, or in guiding the ship of State. Science is interested directly in one
thing only, to wit, discovering new knowledge.5
This unfortunate academic versus cultural dualism is built out of what most now
think are indefensible theory versus fact and fact versus value epistemological
dualisms. While philosophy without knowledge, including the knowledge pro-
vided by the social sciences, is empty; knowledge without philosophical wisdom
is blind. One could have perfect, even indubitable, knowledge of the way the
world is and still not know what he ought to do, so wisdom is beyond knowledge.
Scientific philosophy forgot this in the 20th Century as surely as the social
sciences. Western Folk Psychology, Morality, and Democratie Liberalism made
forgetting easy.
Liberal intellectuals concluded most Citizens are incapable of determining
their own best interests; therefore, it is best if decisions are left to experts. State
control became vested in cadres of bureaucratic elites, including those baptized
in the waters of scientism called technoerats. America is a nation without a ruling
and titled class. Professionalism satisfies elitist needs for Status and distinetion
without connecting to a particular egalitarian Community or tradition. The Ph.
D., LL. D., and M. D. are the mundane imprimatur of the ruling middling classes
in America. For democratie elitists, these letters designate those with sufficient
rationality to rule for the masses of people incompetent to govern themselves.
5 Cited in Becker (1971), p. 28.
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Human Nature and Conduct: Undermining the Psychology of
Democratie Realism
Dewey (1922/1983) Human Nature and Conduct:An Introduction to Social Psy¬
chology is a response to the democratie realist and their psychological, and asso¬
ciated moral, Claims regarding the irrational subconscious and the nature of ra¬
tionality. Dewey does not deny the existence of the subconscious, indeed, for
him it makes up most of the mind. He does, though, think the mind is a social
construetion, so the mind one comes to have has much to do with the society in
which one is raised. Dewey thought democracy the best way to raise a child in a
DARWiNian world.
For Dewey, beliefs are embodied dispositions to act expressing emotion. They
are habits of conduct. As Dewey defines it, the "essence of habit is an acquired
predisposition to ways or modes of response ... Standing predilections and aver-
sions ... It means will" (p. 32). Habits are acquired through transactions with a
habitat, especially a socio-political habitat. Habits interact holistically within the
individual in such a way that, Dewey concludes, "Character is the interpenetra-
tion of habits" (p. 29). Freedom, will, and rationality are not innately determined;
all are produets of building good habits.
"Man is a creature of habit", writes Dewey, "not of reason nor yet of instinet"
(p. 89) We are born with instinets and impulses, but they are too vague to guide
conduct, whereas rationality is an achievement. "Concrete habits do all the per-
ceiving recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, coneeiving and reasoning that
is done", declares Dewey, "Yet habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of
itself stop to think ... Neither does impulse of itself engage in reflection" (p. 125).
Most of our habits, good or bad, are unconscious. Being unconscious does not
necessarily make them irrational. The task of education is to impart intelligent
habits and to render unintelligent habits conscious by reflection so the agent
may intelligently reconstruet them. The habit of reflection and rationality emerge
slowly over years as individuals learn to coordinate their conduct in situations,
especially social situations, wherein the habits acquired up to that time are in-
adequate.
When habits of action are disrupted, the agent is thrown into a State of emo¬
tional disequilibrium and cognitive doubt. This is the context of conscious reflec-
tive inquiry, and for Dewey all inquiries have context. Educating rational agents
involves disrupting their unreflective, habitual, historical funetioning. The end of
inquiry is melioristic; it involves coordinating some Situation so as to remove
doubt and restore habitual funetioning. In such provocative circumstances, im¬
pulses previously controlled by habits are released. Dewey (1922/1983) defines
inquiry or deliberation as follows:
Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action.
It Starts from the blocking of efficient overt action, due to that conflict of prior habit and newly
released impulse ... Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible
action are really like (pp. 132-133).
When one hits bumps on the highway of life the best response is passionate,
elaborate, and creative action; experimentation is required. The highway is con-
genial to human purposes, but only intelligent action will secure what is needed
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and desired, and only critical self-reflection distinguishes the immediately de-
sired from the truly desirable. For Dewey "habits are arts. They involve skill...
craft, and objective materials" (p. 15). The arts of deliberation, intelligence,ratio¬
nality, creative imagination, and self-reflection are learned. They are not innate
endowments, neither are freedom nor natural rights. Again, education is crucial,
although an exclusively cognitive education is not enough. Bodily desires must
become directed toward the truly good and imagination diseiplined to discern
the best moral possibilities. Imagination and passion as well as reason are part of
freedom and moral improvement. Freedom is not innate; rather it is the ability
to become reflectively aware of the environmental contingencies that form and
control our habits of conduct, the ability to imagine alternative possibilities, the
energy and passion to act to actualize those possibilities, and the intelligence to
design effective patterns of action.
Dewey (1928/1984) decries philosophies of freedom that assume "emaneipa-
tion of individuals having a privileged antecedent Status, but promoted no gen¬
eral liberation of all individuals" (p. 100). Liberation for Dewey is an achieve¬
ment, a consequence of reflective creative action. He concludes, "The real objee-
tion to classic Liberalism [WDL] does not then hinge upon concepts of 'indivi¬
dual' and 'society'... The real fallacy lies in the notion that individuals have such
a native or original endowment of rights" (p. 100). Dewey denies the doctrine of
innate natural rights. Rights, like every thing eise in a world of flux, is an aecom-
plishment, a matter of social as well as an individual growth. "Freedom is a
growth", asserts Dewey, "an attainment, not an original possession, and it is
attained by idealization of institutions and law and the active partieipation of
individuals in their loyal maintenance, not by their abolition or reduetion in the
interests of personal judgments and wants" (p. 103). Fundamentally, freedom
involves two things. First, it requires agents to become reflectively conscious of
the environmental contingencies, especially social contingencies, conditioning
their habits of conduct. Second, agents must act to transform the contingencies
of the environment in such a way as to alter their conduct. This is why the public
and private can never be completely separated as proposed by WDL.
Democratie realists assume a dualism between seif and society. Dewey
thought the relationship circular. For him social customs and public institutions
historically determine, although not entirely, the meanings assigned the habits of
individual selves. Deweyjoins Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger in
making language the key to comprehending meaning. Social meanings, inscribed
as habits, constitute the mind for Dewey (1925/1981): "Through speech a person
dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many
roles, not in successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama.
Thus mind emerges" (p. 135). This is bildung. Building a mind is a temporal
event, something that happens in one's personal history. Dramatic role playing
places the emphasis on creative sociality.6 Culture has us before we have it. For
example, there are cultural Scripts prescribing how to play the roles of "good"
women and men. Gender, unlike sex, is a contingent cultural construetion sub-
Dewey's close friend and colleague, George Herbert Mead, works the social theory of mind
and meaning out much more carefully. See Garrison (fortheoming).
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ject to cultural criticism and reconstruction. According to Dewey, what has been
culturally formed may always be artistically reformed.
Although habits are social functions, each individual has a unique biological
inheritance; that means the same social customs and institutions have a different
effect on different individuals. According to Dewey (1922/1983) "customs per-
sist because individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior
customs. An individual usually acquires the morality as he inherits the Speech of
his social group" (p. 43). The quality and character of social institutions deter-
mines the quality and character of individuals, and not some innate endowment.
At the same time unique individuals and their impulses are the only source of
social reconstruction. Dewey (1925/1981) concedes, "Custom is Nomos, lord and
king of all, of emotions, beliefs, opinions, thoughts as well as deed" (p. 165). "Yet
mind in an individualized mode has occasionally some constructive Operation.
Every invention, every improvement in art... has its genesis in Observation and
ingenuity of a particular innovator" (p. 164). This is something totalitarian states
fail to ever understand. Diverse and creative societies create diverse and crea¬
tive individuals who then contribute to the diversity and creativity of the soci¬
ety, so the hermeneutic wheel of partieipatory democracy turns.
"Different institutions", Dewey (1922/1983) finds, "foster antagonistic im¬
pulses and form contrary dispositions" which is what democratie realists fail to
understand (p. 90). They are not realists at all. Racists, and other Champions
of homogeneity, have yet to learn the lesson of Darwinism. In an evolving
Darwinian world, a species' biological genetic diversity is its key to survival.
Dewey thinks something similar holds culturally as well, that is why he advo¬
cates pluralistic democracy. The more effectively individuals and cultures can
dialogue across differences the more ways they have of responding intelligently
to a contingent and dangerous world. This is why Dewey thought pluralistic
communicative democracy the best form of government practically as well as
morally.
Clearly if individual minds, selves, freedom, rationality, and rights emerge his¬
torically in the socio-linguistic practices of a culture then the key to freedom,
rationality, and rights is education. These virtues are simultaneously the histori¬
cal achievement of the society and unique selves. Democracy should be plural¬
istic, partieipatory, provocative, communicative, and transformative. Public
education in a free, rational, and righteous society must be democratie.
The Public and Its Problems: Dewey!s Response to Walter Lippmann
Walter Lippmann was the most articulate of the democratie realists. In books
such as The Phantom Public he condemns partieipatory democracy. Lippmann
argued that Citizens do not know their world directly but only by "fictions",
representations, or maps. This is especially so for remote regions of our world
beyond the Community in which we live. Further, because the world is so com¬
plex it is often necessary to develop stereotypes that allow us to readily respond
to situations. The problem is that quantitative re-cognition is not careful percep¬
tion of the qualitative uniqueness of persons and circumstances.
Lippmann insists building consensus need not be a matter of obtaining ration-
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al consent at all, but merely of determining representative Symbols that conceal
conflict and disguise disagreement. It is worth noting that even if agents are
highly rational, the necessity of relying on representations and stereotyping in
global and comphcated contexts make them vulnerable to their sources of ideas
and values. Manufacturing opinion may be as easy as manufacturing automo¬
biles.
Lippmann notes that newspapers, and the media generally, depend on adver-
tising. The communicative sources of public Information and education are cap-
tured by capital. Media relying on stereotypes and representations that threaten
capital are unlikely to survive in a market economy. Americans are especially
ahistorical people for whom markets have replaced history as the site of social
action. Manipulation is easy if one thinks, as most Americans do, that freedom,
rationality, and human rights are innate (as in WFP and WFM) instead of some¬
thing achieved in personal and cultural history. Arrogant and ahistorical people
are readily manipulated by false representations of public reality.
Lippmann's (1922/1965) analysis takes the elitist turn typical of democratie
realists. With the development of the social and policy sciences it is now possible
to interpolate "some form of expertness between the private Citizen and the vast
environment in which he is entangled" (p. 238). The result, of course, is nonpar-
tieipatory government for, not by, the people. The DEWEYan response is that we
need to reconstruet public institutions, especially schools and media, to educate
democratie Citizens.
Lippmann concludes that self-determination is only one of a plethora of hu¬
man interests including social order, rights, prosperity, amusement, and pleasure.
Partieipatory self-government is only one relatively minor good among others.
One may readily infer much of Dewey's response to Lippmann from what we
have already seen of his psychology. The rest is given in The Public and Its Prob¬
lems, Dewey's only protracted work on political philosophy.
Recall that in Dewey's metaphysics all actions are trans-actions. To survive
and thrive human beings must carry out successful transactions with their envi¬
ronment. Since human beings are socially constructed creatures, social action is
especially important. To sueeeed these actions must be intelligent, creative, and
transformational. Transformations have consequences, including social conse¬
quences. When social consequences are confined to those immediately involved
they are private. When the transactions have significant consequences for those
not immediately involved they are public. The useful distinetion between private
and public must remain somewhat vague: otherwise, we construet a false dualism
between seif and society.
When represented by appropriately designated officials with special powers
the public becomes a State: "A public articulated and operating through repre¬
sentative officers is the State; there is no State without a government, but also
there is none without the public" (Dewey, 1927/1984, p. 277). The quality of the
State depends on the quality of Organization and the extent to which its officers
perform their role in caring not for themselves but for public interests (see p.
256). Dewey grants the State broad powers to intervene in the internal affairs of
a group when important public interests are at stake.
A public remains "inchoate"and unorganized when its members do not realize
they collectively suffer the consequences of some action. When they recognize
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they share consequences a public may emerge.
In recent decades people of very
diverse political opinion in the United States have formed a Single public regar-
ding the consequences of Smoking. A public may
also remain inchoate when the
existing State ignores their needs. Many in the growing private,
and especially
religious, school movement in the United States
feel they are an example.
Dewey distinguishes between what he calls "the Great Society"
and "the
Great Community". The Great Society draws power from the
intersection of
capital, science (including positivistic social science) technology,
and economic
production, "but it is no Community" (p. 296). Indeed,
it erodes Community (p.
314). The Great Society emphasizes centralized bureaucratic management
and
control. President Lyndon B. Johnson tried to build what he
called "The Great
Society". It was modeled after Franklin D. Roosevelt's
"New Deal". Dewey
never cared much for Roosevelt's governmentfor the people. Dewey concludes
that until "the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the
Public
will remain in eclipse, communication can alone create a great Community" (p.
324). The Great Community is a partieipatory democracy requiring
two things to
sustain itself; they are communication and education.
Powerful interests do not necessarily want to free the intelligence of the mas-
ses. Dewey believed Lippmann and the so-called democratie
realist did not pro¬
vide an indietment of public democracy but of private industrial capitalism,
its
control of mass media, and the failure of outdated modes of government to
respond adequately to public needs. Dewey rebuffs
the major Claims advanced
by democratie elitists. First, Dewey proclaims that partieipatory democracy
de¬
mands everyone reeeive the best education possible, not just public
administra-
tors and directors of industry. Dewey did not think this necessarily meant
formal
schooling. Populär media could make a great contribution:
"A genuine social
science would manifest its reality in the daily press, while learned books and
articles supply and polish tools of inquiry" (p. 348). Today this Suggestion
must
extend to all mass media, but capital controls the media.
Next Dewey points out the obvious. The notion of democratie
elitism is non¬
sense. It is just elitism, crass and crude: "A class of experts
is inevitably so re-
moved from common interests as to become a class with private interests and
private knowledge, which in social matters is not [public] knowledge
at all"
(p. 364). This element of democratie realism leads directly
to oligarehy.
In response to the claim that the public is incompetent
to judge matters of
policy intelligently, Dewey offers two related responses. First,
"Until secrecy,
prejudice, bias, misrepresentation, and Propaganda as well as
sheer ignorance
are replaced by inquiry and publicity, we have no way of telling
how apt for
judgment of social policies the existing intelligence of
the masses may be" (p.
366). In typical pragmatic fashion, Dewey urges us to perform
democratie expe¬
riments. Lippmann accurately describes the manipulations of a degenerate actu¬
al form of democracy, but that the public is being deliberately duped does not
prove a better form of democracy could
not free their intelligence.
Second, Dewey retains his stance regarding Western Folk Psychology
and
Morality:
Effective intelligence is not an original, innate endowment.
No matter what are the differences in
native intelligence (allowing for the moment that intelligence can be native),
the actuality of mind
is dependent upon'the education which social conditions
effect ... The level of action fixed by
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embodied intelligence is always the important thing. Capacities are limited by the objects and tools
at hand. They are still more dependent upon the prevailing habits of attention and interest which
are set by tradition and institutional customs. Meanings run in the Channels formed by instrumen-
talities of which, in the end, language, the vehicle of thoughts as well as of communication, is the
most important (p. 366).
When the historical event that is a person's life carries out transactions with the
historical events of a culture, the habits of the former and the customs of the
latter may both become transformed. A culture's technological artifacts, from
flint and steel to steam engines to Computers, may enhance the intelligence of its
members. The same holds for socio-political technologies. Dewey thought par¬
tieipatory democracy the social technology most likely to release individual in¬
telligence to reconstruet cultural customs and material technology. The social
technologies of education and communication are Dewey's preferred vehicles
of social transformation, not revolution.
In the end Dewey, like Emerson, distrusted large organizations. Dewey's pre¬
ferred sites of experimental inquiry, communication, and practical action were
always small scale:
The problem of securing diffused and seminal intelligence can be solved only in the degree in which
local communal life becomes a reality. Signs and Symbols, language, are the means of communica¬
tion by which a fraternally shared experience is ushered in ... Systematic and continuous inquiry
into all the conditions which affect association and their dissemination in print is a precondition of
the creation of a true public. But it and its results are but tools after all. Their final actuality is
aecomplished in face-to-face relationships by means of direct give and take. Logic in its fulfillment
recurs to the primitive sense of the word: dialogue. Ideas which are not communicated, shared, and
reborn in expression are but soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought (p. 371).
Dewey's etymology is correct; logic derives from the ancient Greek Aoyog
(logos), a Speech, or to speak. Dewey thinks the most logical form of democracy
should emphasize experimental inquiry, partieipatory Community effort, and
conversation.
While philosophy may contribute insights into what a public ought to be,
Dewey thought that how "protean historic states" actually perform their func-
tions is not a philosophical problem per se. For him it was a matter of continuous
critical reflection and experimental examination within a world in flux. Policies
that may work well during one historical epoch, or in a particular place, may fail
miserably later. What we require to close the gap between what is and what
ought to be in a contingent, ever changing, world congenial enough to our pur¬
poses is intelligent social experimentation.
Some Criticisms and Reflections Upon Our Times
Dewey's preferred method of forming publics and reconstrueting society is ped-
agogy and dialogue. He was involved in organizing the American Civil Liberties
Union, the American Association of University Professors, the New School for
Social Research, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, and many other organizations. He was a major contributor to the New
Republic and many other widely circulating publications. No American aca-
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demic has ever received the public recognition accorded John Dewey. Yet he
distrusted large scale political organizations and preferred small face-to-face
communication in local communities. Are such communities realizable in a
globalized world?
Dewey lacked any extensive analysis of the Operations of capital in modern
democracies. This is a serious criticism since capital tends toward monopoly and
is therefore inherently undemocratic. He could have profited immensely from
reading Marx. Dewey also seems naive in his understanding of social, political,
and economic power. He does, though, frame a desirable image of partieipatory
democracy. Dewey inquires of the public: "By what means shall its inchoate and
amorphous estate be organized into effective political action relevant to present
social needs and opportunities?" (p. 313). It is a question he must take seriously.
Elsewhere, Dewey (1922/1983) remarks that an ideal "becomes an aim or end
only when it is worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its rea-
lization that is in terms of 'means'" (p. 161). It is a grave DEWEYan criticism of
Dewey that he does little to articulate such means.
As the 20th Century advanced, Dewey lost his middle class constituency
either to Marxist ideologies of class struggle and party Organization or "realist"
democratie liberalism. Ironically, populär unrest in the United States in the
1990's seems to seek partieipatory democracy. The inchoate public is again
struggling to organize itself for effective political action relevant to present so¬
cial needs and opportunities. The United States is now in the midst of a populist
rebellion that struggles to name what oppresses it. Knowledge is desperately
needed, but it does not come because the people, devoted to WFP, WFM, and
WDL, cannot even frame the inquiry. This rebellion is going to fail. Partieipatory
democracy is dead in the United States, Marxism is considered a complete fail¬
ure, while elitist democracy is evolving into technoeratie oligarchy and multina¬
tional cooperate plutoeraey.
Much of the populist unrest has been deflected into reduetion of federal gov¬
ernment, welfare reform, and school reform. Those who know anything about
the history of American education in the 20th Century know there is nothing
fundamentally new in any of this. The emphasis on more State mandated testing
reduces wisdom to knowledge and knowledge to Information on a pencil and
paper, machine graded, multiple choice test. This is simply a continuation of
what Arthur E. Wise (1979) described twenty years ago in his book: Legislated
Learning: The Bureaucratization ofthe American Classroom. All these experts
really know how to talk about is raising test scores without providing the means,
and certainly without providing funding, to do so. Selves really are reduced to
ciphers. It is merely technoeratie democratie realism applied to schools.
Current school choice initiatives seeking to free schooling from elitist and
centralized State steering is understandable. As a Deweyan, I tend to support
more local control of schools and their curriculum, and I find the idea of charter
schools intriguing. The real danger, though, is that a pluralistic nation will frag-
ment into parochial homogenous communities that see no need to communicate
with those different from themselves, and that is something a pluralistic society
cannot survive. The struggle over school choice is a crucial battlefield in the war
of many diverse inchoate publics to organize themselves. If it is possible to se¬
cure local school choice without destroying the common shared experiences
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necessary to hold a union together, then America will find a better future than I
antieipate.
I feel Dewey's struggles in the 1920's provide a distant mirror for reflection
upon the 1990's. In terms of Dewey's critique ofWestern Folk Psychology,
West¬
ern Folk Morality, Western Democratie Liberalism, and democratie realism,here
is what I think is happening to the public in the United States today. The elitist
democratie government for the people that gripped the nation from Roose¬
velt's "New Deal" to Johnson's "Great Society" is rightly deemed a failure by
the populous. Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 is a historical watershed.
Marxism, or any other critique of capital, is falsely assumed to have been re-
futed. The public is striving to regain government by the people. They will not
succeed. Multinational cooperate capitalism will emerge as the unchallenged
victor of the social, political, and economic struggles of the 20th Century, and to
the victor go the spoils.
The current populist upraising in the United States represents little more than
a romantic escape into the fantasy of innate freedom, individual rationality, and
the doctrine of natural rights contained in WFP, WFM,WDL. This fantasy is fed
and manipulated by mass media and cooperate international capitalism. Corpu-
lent and complacent, America is lost somewhere in Disney World. The State will
continue to steer, although not for the people. It will work largely for multina¬
tional capital in the new world order. Western ideology assures the public in the
United States that each individual owns themselves without the effort of reflec¬
tion and creative inquiry. The irony is those who are convinced by this ideology
are precisely those most enslaved, irrational, undeserving of rights, and least self-
possessed. They are too lazy to engage in the hard work required to achieve
these desirable traits, so they just assume they were born with them. The Slogan
of politicians and multinational cooperate capitalism is
- let them eat ideology.
The diet will prove fatal.
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